How EPRDF Rules
The Meles-led regime in Ethiopia has many of the characteristics of Triple Threats – a strong military, a strong party machinery and a strong leader. In that it resembles the regime in Egypt. Triple Threats have total control on the army and use it as an adjudicator of political contention. In some Triple Threats, the army’s adjudicatory role is frequent; in others it is an institution of last resort. Often the leaders of Triple Threats have military backgrounds (but may not be military members as they are in power).
Often times in Ethiopian politics, it is hard to see the trees from the forest. We write, talk and argue about incidents – several of them. Connecting the dots to get the general picture seems to require more time and patience than we have. But what is more worrisome, and surely an anaesthetic for the brain, is the lazy assumption that the party and the man who have ruled us for two decades act without strategy. The usual refrain among some Addis Neger commenters whenever posters try to analyze EPRDF is: “Don’t go there. It is a group of fascistic thugs (or a mafia-like organization) that loots Ethiopia without shame” – as though the organizational dynamics and actions of Mafia groups were functions of the collusion of random variables.
This is a discomforting truth: the durability of some authoritarian regimes is not a product of miracles. As Morten Boas claims, ascending to power by itself cannot “guarantee stability and survival.” Maintaining control of the institutions of power requires constant strategic thinking and doggedness: traits profusely prevalent at least at the prime minister’s home. Those who aspire to depose him have to understand how he and his party rule.
For years, political scientists have systematically studied authoritarian regimes and leadership durability. Two of my favourite works are Barabara Geddes’ Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of Game Theoretic Model and What Do We Know about Democratization after 20 Years. Geddes’ uses a much criticized typology of dictatorship (i.e. personalist, one-paty, and military), but it is less messy than a lot of the analytical frameworks proposed by different scholars. There are hybrid dictatorships and subsequent works cover them well. Giddes’ findings are striking.
Military regimes, on average, survive less long than other types. They are more likely to negotiate their
extrications and to be followed by competitive political systems. They are less likely to end in
coups, popular uprising, armed insurgency, revolution, invasion, or assassination. Personalist
regimes, in contrast, are more likely than other types to end in violence and upheaval. Their
ends are also more likely to be precipitated by the death of the dictator or foreign pressure, and
they are more likely to be followed by some new form of authoritarianism. Single-party regimes
last the longest, but when uncontrollable popular opposition signals that the end is near, like the
military, they negotiate the transition.
A study by Natasha Ezrow puts the average length of years each regime type rules(as of 2007).
1. Monarchies and Triple Threats 40-45 years
2. One-party 34.5 years
3. One-party/personalist 22.5 years
4. One-party/Military 16 years
5. Military-Personalist 13 years
6. Military 5.5 years
The Meles-led regime in Ethiopia has many of the characteristics of Triple Threats – a strong military, a strong party machinery and a strong leader. In that it resembles the regime in Egypt. Triple Threats have total control on the army and use it as an adjudicator of political contention. In some Triple Threats, the army’s adjudicatory role is frequent; in others it is an institution of last resort. Often the leaders of Triple Threats have military backgrounds (but may not be military members as they are in power).
Triple Threats also use a distribution of patronage and political perks to recruit members and co-opt the elite, and provide either real or façade ideology as a means of cohesion. That is supplemented by a careful cultivation of personal popularity and power for the leader as a tier of all. No other individual is allowed to develop a power base that could provide him enough political capital to compete or oust the leader. Triple Treats are generally very resilient dictatorships.
Until 2001, EPRDF’s regime was One-Party/Military. There was a more than medium level of factionalism, which ensured that the leader’s powers were in check. The ideology of revolutionary democracy as explained by the 1993 document (revolutionary democracy 1) had a prominent role in maintaining the unity of the party and as a guiding principle for state policy. The institutionalization of the party was high; the removal of Meles Zenawi would not have caused chaotic transfer of power or party-collapse. The army was controlled firmly by the regime.
Some of these characteristics still exist long after factionalism was wiped out following Meles’ decisive victory in the 2001 internal battle. The monopoly over the use of force is intact. The role of ideology (revolutionary democracy 2 and 3) as a cohesive factor is moderately strong, albeit for rhetorical purposes than as a philosophy which informs decisions and actions. A lot has changed too. The institutionalization of the party has been reversed. The cult of personality is rising. Personal feuds in the party which has an ever increasing elite membership are increasing, but the leader keeps himself above the fray. Coup/assassination-proof strategies are meticulously designed and implemented.
Detailed Strategies
Military control
-Economic interest: one of the key steps Hossni Mubarak took after he succeeded Anwar Sadat was to let high and medium ranking military officers develop business interests. That has created a very satisfied and wealthy military; one that is happy with the status quo. In the words of Ezrow, “the military is taken care of financially.” Meles seems to have read the Mubarak book very well.
-Systematic corruption (actively helping the corruption of army officers, but recording their involvement)
- Disincentivizing disloyalty and ambition (purging and repressing quickly) and incentivizing loyalty (promotions, business deals, neglect of corruption)
-Ethnic division
-The personal supervision of Meles Zenawi(the number of evaluative sessions in the army led by Meles are staggering)
Party Machinery
-Use the party to co-opt national and local elite and repress those who cannot be co-opted(see my article). I will write more about elite fragmentation and co-option in the future.
- Coalition management through individualization of party politics. As we have seen in the recent evaluative meetings (Gimgema) in Addis Ababa, EPRDF leaders actively discourage social ties and relationships within the party to ensure that there is no danger of such networks growing to political factions
-Individual feuding (let them fight each other without hurting the organizational capabilities of the party), but not general intra-elite disagreement
Personalist control
-Branding (Meles as a genius; Meles as a leader of Africa; Meles as an international persona etc)
-Tight Pyramidal structure with excessive control of decision making
-Internal propaganda that the party collapses without the leader
-Constant reshuffling, promotion, demotion of leaders
-Discouraging ambition and independent thinking
So what does this mean to opponents of Meles? That will be the subject of another article.
Good analysis, I liked it except some part of it. An analyst dependent on some personal emotional reference like(Nathasha Ezrow)does not seem to work with the Ethiopian Context. It is to fulfill your feelings. try to give a solution(Violence) of removing EPRDF is being silly, EPRDF is not as simple as you are trying to model it. I was expecting you to put the Ethiopian situation like the Iranian context. Or hoping I will see your analysis in that respect rather that Egypt. Any way this time EPRDF is better than the ill diaspora opposition and the Capability of the non-sense oppositions in the country.
Thank you any way!!
Addis from Addis
appreciatioin to Abiy for the professional article that tries to bring a theoretical background where the political reality in Ethiopia falls back. My contemplation on type of ruling by the Melesl regime confirms the soundness of the strategies laid out by Abiy. Looking forward to see the next article as to what the Meles opposition should opt-for as a systematic strategy. I can see that the strtegy may be far less practical than it may sound to be coz, the opposition camp is proved to be too hetrogenous and too weak to execute any systematic strategy.
This piece is excellent in terms of putting stuff in perspective and helps analyzing possible events in pieces. However, the whole power consolidation process takes place little by little, one incident leading to another rather than with deep thinking and strategizing. The person who takes advantage of the circumstances develops the skill and has a better vision of what opportunities may offer in the longterm. But once you are on top maintaining the power for long term might require some strategy but not a whole lot. There are many variables that are out of the control of the dictator. Simple example, the economy. Despite Meles’ government claim, the economy is plummeting. The gap between the rich and the poor is widening. Poverty is increasing. Wealth is being dangerously accumulated by one ethnic group. The consequence is simply dangerous. It is only a matter of time, people will say enough is enough.
Brilliant Abiye Teklemariam!
A nice article in terms of putting how you have already understood or wanted to understand meles and co. Actually I have said few times on this blog that I know how you try to tell for your readers about meles and co. This starts way back from your addis neger paper.
By saying this I want to be categorized into the group of people who understood meles and co as no more than a mafia group who just are here because of historical advantage and who do not think beyond keeping power for another single day thinking the next day may take care of itself.
I am not be a political scientist but it is not difficult for anyone to connect the dots (most of them actually are back dots) put by woyane and tell what are they and how they think.
There is however always a room for social scientists to try to analyze even if what you want to analyze is just an empty mafia group like EPRDF.
Lets not get mistaken the only guys who can bring change to ethiopia are those who have really understood this behavior of woyane as they can focus only what should they do rather than a non existing tactic in the woyane neighborhood.
I am willing to hear from you and I hope you will post my comment .
I would rather have liked it if it(the piece) was more on the practical issues focusing i.e. more on why we continue to be ruled by a regime that generates an almost unanimous disgust among the social and political elite in and outside of the country and the urban poor regardless of ethnic affiliations.Reproducing some theoretical analysis on the typology of dictatorships, it seems to be is not sth that we are really lacking in.It reminded me of what you addis neger guys used to call features in your paper.You used to display lofty and down to earth ideas in the topics and you plunge into reproducing the writings of some ferenji after two paragraphs and get lost in it.We appreciate your attempts and we might also be impressed by the number of titles of books you mention in a one page article but please save that for studies and focus on analysing issues that really matter.Am saying this cos I suppose you guys are writing for a purpose,not just as a hobby.If so, just think for a while that there many who look up to your work and get some inspiration to to add to the momentum of social change in the country,which in the era we are in could to a large extent be facilitated by the efficient use of blogs and other social media forums.
The first lines of this commentary are very mind-catching and I was eager to read the whole material. Abiye dealt with a crucial part of Ethiopian politics in that we need to unravel the factors behind the EPRDF rule of the last two decades. Unfortunately, the article did not live up to its promises. Abiye appears to be at best unaware of or at worst dismissive of other research which tells different stories on the subject. Before trying to forcefully fit the Ethiopian situation into the Geddes model, he should have told us why he chose to overlook the influential works of Acemoglu, Levitsky, Tullock and Olson, to name a few. Some of the works, particularly that of Daron Acemoglu, are apparently technically complex stuff albeit far from being messy. When established scholars speak of their ‘favourite works’, we stop and listen. With no disrespect intended, Abiye is not there and hence the onus is on him to convince us as to why we buy into the Geddes’ work. One thing is certain, however. Abiye’s writings are daring, thought-provoking and timely.
Michael,
If you had read some of my articles previously, you would have known that I used Levitsky, Olson, Acemoglu and Besely a lot. Geddes’ typology is more relevant for this article than, say, Levitsky’s works on competitive authoritarianism, because she focuses almost exclusively on the nexus between regime durability and type. The main research issue in much of the works of the writers you mentioned relates to why some countries are democracies and others are not. Although some discussions overlap, asking why certain types of authoritarian regimes last long(Giddes), and asking how and why certain authoritarian regimes democratized and others did not(Levitsky) or asking what leads to a consolidation of democracy and what derails it(Acemoglu) or asking the relationship between regime type and economic performance(Olson) are not the same. One serious scholar who asked the same question as Giddes did was Erica Fartz. In an academic setting, I would have received a probing question if I had chosen Giddens over Fartz without explaining. In a blog, I can’t do a literature review.
Abiye
Aby,
It seems that you are under the impression that by belittling the sophistication of EPRDF you can satisfy your obesity to see the weakening and fall of EPRDF. Well, it is good you tried to reflect your thoughts about EPRDF and the government under it though your analysis is skin-deep. It is sad you couldn’t dare to speak about the sophistication of Meles.
How do you differ yourself from the stubborn opposition parties how don’t see any positive thing coming out of Ethiopia? It is very sad to see people like you falling in the trap of the old and uncivilized politics.
well done Abiye. kaleb, yaza n Michael if u r good in writing like him, please write some article and let us enjoy it. do not forget that Abiye as an individal is entitled to his opinion.
Dear Kaleb,
Why do you want to blame Abiye than blaming the TPLF thugs in Arat Kilo who have harvested mass crime in the past 20 years?
You want to tell us that Meles ahs built bridges, roads, dams, etc and he deserves to miserably rule us. You know that the Italian colonizers also built roads, bridges, dams, etc in the country. I do not know why TPLF supporters justify crime by bridges, roads and dams. By this conclusion Benito Mussolini was not a fascist because he connected Ethiopia by road from north to south and west to east and the patriots of Ethiopia were wrong to launch guerilla warfare against Mussolini. Because Mangistu Hailemariam gave us roads, factors (Bedele, Harar, Assala, etc), bridges, etc he is exonerated from his heinous crimes during the Red Terror!! Because Stalin has brought USSR to the level of America in Nuclear technology he is exonerated from his monstrous crimes during the great purge that sent millions to the Gulag Archipelago. The issue of “liberty and the pursuit of happiness” are questions by their own right and should not be subjected to bridges, roads, dams as the “sophisticated Meles” wants to tell us!!!!
The “sophistication of Meles” that you want to preach is nothing but it is like the “sophistication” of other African lootocrats, petty dictator and the Mafia. The so called “sophistication of Meles” (if it exists at all) emanates from the privately owned tribal militia and tribal security force. Meles is not sophisticated rather he is vulgar and tasteless who converted the country into his private property and open prison where his New Class can loot and kill with impunity. For TPLF supporters the problem lies in the “stubborn opposition parties” not the TPLF thugs and thieves in power who are attempting to build “Ye Shifta Capitalism.“ For you and other TPLF thugs the opposition parties are stubborn because they refused to accept “sophistication of Meles” who increased State sponsored crime-per capita in the past 20 years. If you think Abiye is falling in the trap of the old and uncivilized politics here below are the Woyannie Crimes Dossier that was harvested from the new and civilized politics of the “sophisticated” TPLF guru-Legesse Zenawi:
• Meles Zenawi’s victims of deliberate Starvation
• The April 2003 Massacre at Addis Ababa!
• TPLF’s Crimes in April 2005 in the middle of the city
• Weyane’s depopulation tactic thru village torching Exposed!!
• Ethiopia: Meles appoints wife (Azeb Mesfin) as CEO of EFFORT
• GENOCIDE! GENOCIDE!! GENOCIDE!!! against the Ethio-Somalis
• STOP THE GENOCIDE IN ETHIOPIA !!
• Cruel and inhumane actions against street children in Addis
• ONLF: TPLF troops killing over 50 civilians in East Ethiopia
• Who was the architect of the Arbagugu Massacer?
• Somalia’s TFG and Weyane Accused of War Crimes
• The Torture of Ato Geze Rede
• TPLF regime implicated in war crimes in Somalia: HRW
• Collective Punishment
• Woyanne’s scorched-earth tactic to depopulate Ogaden – HRW
• The Meles regime to block food to rebel region in Ethiopia
• Seye said: Tigraians of Eritrean extraction are the rulers
• The Hidden Famine in Gonder
• Famine hits Ethiopia, while WEYANE UPS MILITARY BUDGET
• A Cold-blooded Murder by TPLF
• Modern Crime against humanity
• AMNESTY: 21 SOMALI IMMAS MURDERED,7-THROAT CUT 11-EXECUTED
• TPLF sends 15000 troops to Somalia while millions r Starving
• A survivor in mass murder spree by TPLF vanguards in Ogadeni
• Weyane-Ethno-Dictatorial-Minority-Military-Junta’s ECONOMY!!
• CRIME: TPLF switching Ethio’s GOLD with PYRITE (fool’s gold)
• TPLF-Ethno-Dictatorial-Minority-Military-Junta killing spree
• Ogaden Crackdown Carries High Cost
• Woyanne’s Dirty War (Newsweek)
• Compare the ‘Kenya mafia’ with the ‘Woyanne mafia’
• TPLF killed Commercial Bank of Ethiopia’s President 1/26/06
• TPLF using Ethio resources for Tigrai hard currency supply
• Under Weyane 4.5mil people face mass starva in Ogaden:Holmes
• Weyane on mass murder spree against civilians in Ogadenia
• TPLF OWNS ETHIOPIA politically and economically
• Weyane planting explosives in NAZRET to scare people
• 6-more journalists flee from Weyane’s jaw
• Weyane closing all path to aid needy civilians in Ogadenia
• Journalist Tesfaye Tadesse murdered
• War crimes against civilians ‘rampant’ in Somalia
• Shell shocked: Civilians Under Siege in Mogadishu
• The Woyannie Regime says, it killed 500 Ogadenians
• Woyanne soldiers rape Somali girl
• Woyanne forces bomb markets and civilian homes
• The kidnapping and torture of Captain Teshome Tenkolu
• Woyanne savagery against students in Dembi Dollo
• Catastrophe looming in Ogaden
• Daniel Beyene (Tortured 1998-2000) murdered (2001)
• Cap. Teshome Tenkolu (Tortured 1998-2000)
• Execution of 4 youths in Gondar by Federal Police
• 14-year old Messeret Tadesse shot in the back by Woyanne
• A young heroine pays the ultimate sacrifice
• Student Shot Dead By Federal Police Officer in Addis Ababa
• The cold-blooded murder of student Shibiru Demissie
• Even Ethiopian wild animals under threat by Woyanne
• Students killed in brutal police attack
by
• Woyanne war crimes in Ogaden – Human Rights Watch
• Gaara Suffii: The Killing Mountain – Lest We Forget!
• Adebabay Yesus mass-murder (sept 7, 1993 Gonder )
• The murder of AAU students (Addis Ababa, jan. 1993)
• Woyanne commits genocide in Gambela
• An index of Woyanne crimes against the people of Ethiopia
• The brutal murder of Assefa Maru
• Professor Asrat Woldeyes
• Tesfaye Tadesse (beaten to death Jan. 2007, Addis Ababa)
• Seblework Tadesse (beaten, imprisoned AA, Kaliti 2005)
• Documents on Woyanne crimes
Sources: http://www.ethiopianreview.com/forum/viewforum.php?f=4&sid=363eb5cc9bffb374851796720654e77f)
Thank you very much Lubeck you are one of the few who really understood who meles is. I hope people drop their persuation towards making people believe that meles is a sophosticated leader. Because we went far enough now to stop even thinking about that .
If there is a stategy or whatsoever in the meles camp it is a how to stay in power for one night and if there is anyone who wants to block that he/she will face the consequence.
I agree with your point regarding the need for serious analysis of the architecture and dynamics of TPLF/EPRDF’s power. But I am afraid your analysis is at best descriptive, and the comparison with Egypt’s Mubarak rather misplaced. Any analysis that overlooks ethnicism, the key element in EPRDF’s ‘worldview’ and political strategy, misses the point. I think the experiences of ethnic-centered political processes in various African countries, as well as in the rest of the world such as Yugoslavia, would yield more productive analytical perspectives.
Dawit,
One of the features that I observed in EPRDF is that by startegy, operational necessities, member(s) initiative and trial and error, it has developed a mechanisms of maintaining power that appears to have similarities with diverse regimes. For the post-2006 dogged and successful implementation of elite fragmentation, individualization of politics, nod-breaking, personality-cult formation and the long-tem army corruption, the closest model I can think of is Egypt. For some aspects of the ethnicization of politics, one may look for other places. For the use of ventilatory freedoms, there are other comparable models. This is what I said as a general statement:
“The Meles-led regime in Ethiopia has many of the characteristics of Triple Threats – a strong military, a strong party machinery and a strong leader. In that it resembles the regime in Egypt.” My comparison with Mubarak- except in specific strategic decision and actions- was limited to the fact that both have three strong features. On how one creates those features, I probably mentioned Egypt once or twice. You are guilty of overinterpretation.
I, however, agree that my analysis was descriptive and that was what I set out to do.
abiyee
very nicely skeletoned item. sophisticated politics deconstructed is what describes it.
Greetings to you,
Your analysis on Meles is good in some measures but lack insight in others. Meles can not be compared to Mubarak for the following reasons
1. Meles gave Assab port (which is Ethiopian since time immemorial) to Eritrea without any consideration for national interest
2. Meles gave land to Sudan to buy influence (and perhaps sold the land under the table)
3. Meles organizaed EFFORT and assigned his own wife to have a personal control on the looting
4. In Ethiopia the corruption is not only by the military, but by everyone from Tigray (a right for importing untaxed goods is given to people from Tigray in a scheme to help them get richer and faster)
We haven’t heard that Mubarak’s wife controla a mega corporation that loots the country, we have never heard that Mubarak has given up anyhting of national interest. Meles is not only a dictator, he is a dictator with an inferiority complex and hatred for his fellow country men.
“Teshome” and “Kaleb” I am not sure if this is your right names or if a letter is not missing from the spellings of your names, do you really want to call Meles an intelectual, or a genius, he is none of it. Remember destroying a country wouldn’t take a genius, building one will.
Dear Abye,
I would like to thank you for your continued endeavors in digging to provide us with some insight about the hell that is taking place in our poor country Ethiopia.
Regarding this article, I am not satisfied. I believe EPRDF has never been led by a real strategy in ruling Ethiopia since 1993. As far as I understand, strategy is about achieving a goal by orchestrating resources in an effective and effecient manner. Here, the goal of Meles(TPLF)changed from ‘liberating’ Tigray to ruling Ethiopia in 1992.It seems for me the previous two decades were the extension of the initial goal.
It seems for me, Meles doesnot have strategic thinking about how to rule Ethiopia as a country. But when you see back on the major events that happened for the previous 20 yrs, it seems as if there was a strategy.
I believe the only strength of Meles is he got a strong Ethnic support.He is successful in preaching them he is the best and his ethnic camp follows him as if he is their god. so he put them in the military, in key economic sectors etc.
More over, if Meles had a strategy he would have worked towards building a one strong Ethiopia than one divided by
Ethnicity and Economy(think of the economic gap). Further, if this guy had a sense of strategic thinking he would work towards bringing about good governance, and a country with a promising sustainable socioeconomic development.
Believe it or not, Meles will end up in building a country, where he and his families cannt live in it. granted he and his group will rule Ethiopia for the next 15 years. But, finally his empire will vanish. At that time you journalists will about “the consequence of ruling a country with our a strategic-direction”
keep inspiring me abiy….. what an argumentative article…..i appreciate that i like the introductory statements….which will exactly suit for blind and narrow visioned opposers ….hmmm…they have got to see the trees from the forest….
@Abiye, after the “co-option theory”, “The Aljazeera effect thory”, “The dictator’s dilemma theory”,”The Selectorate theory”, etc, etc., now it is ” The Triple Threat Theory”‘s turn. In fact you have credited the ‘owners’ of the theiries. But your success here made me curious. And I now believe that there is a documented theory somewhere to give your prejudices a semblance of intellectualism if you know how to use it. How at least some of the theories you used might have developed? This week, David Cameroon called Gaza “a prison camp” while visiting Turkey, a day latter in India, said “Pakistan must not be allowed to promote export of terror”. Then came his interview with the journalist from the bbc. “Is it a new kind of diplomacy?” IF it doesn’t already exist, there is a new theory of diplomacy. And you will be using it to convince us why this government is not good.
Abiy,
You write: “Meles-led regime in Ethiopia has many of the characteristics of Triple Threats – a strong military, a strong party machinery and a strong leader. In that it resembles the regime in Egypt.”
As you certainly know, typologies are a mixed bag in social/political analysis. But let me agree with you that, at the formal level, the characteristics of Triple Threats do indeed help to describe the architecture of TPLF/EPRDF’s power.
But that descriptive scheme has limited utility for analyzing governance strategy and political dynamics in today’s Ethiopia. At the level of political content/substance, the Ethiopian picture is a lot more complicated than the Triple Treats scheme can help deconstruct.
For example, which organization does represent real political power in Ethiopia: TPLF or EPRDF? And does the former really constitute a “strong” party since the 2000 split? Or does party even really matter in the construction of political power in Ethiopia? One could actually argue with good reason that real political power is located not in party or government, but in the quasi-politburo that was created around the PM’s office in the middle of the 2005 post-election crisis. What is the logic behind the creation of that exclusive club of political power away from party and government?
Another example: In Egypt, the organizing principle of (one) party politics is Egyptian nationalism, a shared value and consensus point for the political class and the larger society. By contrast, in Ethiopia, ethncism serves as the central organizing principle of ideology and politics. It makes the picture even more complicated when one considers that the ideology and politics of ethnicsm is promoted by an elite group that claims to represent a relatively small ethnic population. And yes, both the military and security services are beholden to ethnicism, and their leadership is recruited mainly from that minority ethnic population.
My point is this: In order to capture analytically the intricacies of political dynamics in Ethiopia, one has to consider a critical anomaly that distinguishes the Ethiopian context from most one-party states in Africa or elsewhere in the world, namely the role of ethnicity as the central organizing principle of ideology and politics. Both the strengths and weaknesses of the regime’s strategies are attributable to its professed commitment to that organizing principle.
BTW, I do agree with you that the regime has learned quite a lot over the years in terms of creating structures and processes for maintaining its hold on power. The opposition ought to learn from the regime’s smart moves, but not less from the regime’s inherent weaknesses as well. I think AN is making a remarkable contribution to raising the level of political discourse among Ethiopians, and thereby to the evolution of a smarter opposition.
I totally agree with Dawit’s assertion that AN’s great contribution to raising the level of political discourse among Ethiopians, and thereby to the evolution of a smarter opposition.Thank you guys!!
Here are my points Abiye missed in his article or I wish to read from his next article.
1.analyzing TPLF/EPRDF and framing it in any political theory without its ethnic politics would be shallow. I haven’t seen any consistent strategy by the group in the last two decades except the ethnic politics as divide and rule mechanism.It worked for the last two decades and I don’t think they will change this successful strategy.
2.The group disregard the national interest of the country and calculates only about its survival. No one seen any dictatorship in the world that goes against the national interest of the county as TPLF/EPRDF.Even Shabiya or Derg though dictators aren’t accused of going against the interest of the country even by their ardent opponents.
The scandal of the Woyane goes as far as openly safeguarding the interest of Eritrea but not Ethiopia.The issue of Assab can be raised as an example here.
3. I really appreciate also if you try to analyze Derg and the Emperor or for that matter Shabiya to see how they can explained in this theories.
4.What about the opposition? No
one tried to explain the opposition parties in this way. That will help them to find a way forward from the current stalemate. I think their reactive mode to the actions of TPLF/EPRDF have brought only the 99.6 % defeat. They need to become proactive in deciding their fate. I think any trial in that direction would be appreciated.
what a brilliant article!forget the detractors keep writing a well thought articles. thank u abiy .
I agree with Dawit, the issue of Ethnic politics should be considered seriously. Who controls the strong military? the intelligence? The other three parties?
I do not profess to know the theory behind totalitarianism but comparative analysis of two drastically different setting to show Melse strength and compare him with Mubark of Egypt to hold on to power by some genius strategy does not hold water.
Egypt is relatively homogeneous with a solid middle class and much wealthier society. The infrastructure is well developed and has a professional army.
A few conditions in favor of Melse and his bandits to walk in without much challenge
Mengestu destroyed every strength Ethiopia had in every sector
The post cold war advantage (any thing but the old guard)
A centralized system of control intact for Melse to walk in
The most destitute and abused population on earth
The claim of genius does not hold water
For a self declared minority liberation leader he has no choice but to act like an occupying force. (Divide, plunder, patronize his clan, hide behind foreigners, and put his best assassins in the few institutions, it has noting to do with genius but paranoia.
The claim of educated leader
The co-founder of Open University in London claim Melse and his close clans are his first students in Arat kelo palace and the reason he started the university after he get paid well by Melse handlers (The British intelligence) and quickly grew handing diplomas for dictators in third world countries before it expand in North America. The important thing is not diploma but the PR to make him presentable. For a street smart hustler it came naturally to him
The claim of strong military
They are gorilla fighters who changed uniform and their being strong does not hold water. It is because they are socked in blood when they came in with their EPLF handlers to buy clan loyalty. They have no place to go with all the blood on their hands. They resemble more like an urban gang who have to kill for initiation to show their loyalty. If you meant armed to their teeth you are right. Melese willing to serve the west bought him guns to protect someone interest as well as his unlike Esayas.
And one thing that keeps him going is greed with vengeance. The people of Tigriy are booby trapped to go no where.
Finally, the ethnic and religion card still works not as a strategy but necessity. He still acts as an occupier.
This self inflected wound and the paranoia that followed is what kept TPLF going. It is a no-way-in and no-way-out situation for Woyanes and Ethiopians are wondering how to get rid of him without ethnic warfare. Credit is due for our people not the ethnic lord Melse.
A few of his admirers here who consider him genius tell us more about their lack of it than his
Thank you for your analysis.
In social science most of the time theories do not fully describe realities. Even some times they generalize realities. In your analysis Meles and Mubarak are classified in the same cathegory, and this fact has been commented by Dawit and others.
The other fact is the issue of Ethnic politics and ,hate and fear mongering in both military, and pary politics almost missed from your analysis.This is most crucial for survival of TPLF thugs as we will see.
TPLF thugs main agenda is to stay in power.To stay in power the leaders of TPLF compromise national interest and their principles on top all the crimes they commit against Ethiopian people.
Then it come the strategy, and the strategy evolves and changes accordingly. Strong army, strong party, and strong leader theoeretically seems sound. I don’t think it properly reflects the reality. Do you think Ethiopian army is strong? In what sense? Do you think the military is coherently organized? Do you think the military can cope with internal armed resistance? For me the military is organized from the point of view of making sure of long term survival of TPLF, which might not be strenth in terms of national interest.
The military is controlled by one ethninic group with no national agenda. Most of these leaders are with law level of political awareness.
To maintain to coherence of the the military leaders, they are allowed to loot, as Abiy mentioned. On top of that they are indoctrinated with hate and fear of other Ethnic groups. They are made to think looting as entitlment for the sacrifice they paid in the jungle.That is why the top level of the military looks like criminal mafia connected by blood and crime.
When we come to lower level members of the military, they are divided and powerless. Those with Ethiopiawi agenda are purged.
The party machinery, most of the members are careerists and bottom feeders, and you can’t rely on them.If something happens to the party, they will abandon the party with out any hasitation.
It seems Meles has built a personality cult among the party members. Being accepted as strong leader in the party in not enough to stay in power. Meles needs a military back up. Do top military leaders like him? I don’t think so. But they have no choice as there is no better alternative at the moment. A practical example is, when Siye and co were purged from TPLF in 2001, the military came under Meles even if they didn’t like him.
A question for Abiy: which party of EPRDF ( among four) do you think will remain a member of EPRDF/ will continue to exist if EPRDF becomes opposition party? Do you expect the military will remain as it is if EPRDF loses Power? I think the situation sugggests no strong—–. Only Ethnic politics
Abiy,
I enjoy reading your sensational and analytical articles. I am also so happy to witness that there are committed , young Ethiopians who are determined to take control of the direction of their country by paying all the sacrifices necessary. My biggest worry this days has been the fact that EPRDF is producing a generation that is raised with out role models, no love and respect to their own identity and past, and with no sense of vision and responsibility to take over and transform their country and then pass it over to the next generation. Your website and many more keep me hopeful. Yes, I agree that we need to understand well the mechanism of rule that EPRDF has employed to lengthen its iron grip on the people of this poor nation. I only hope that we ethiopians shall start organizing ourselves in every corner of the world to expose and confront this barbaric mercenaries. Those “hodams” that are co-opted by the regime are just opportunists and need to show them our contempt and detest. This days , EPRDF is mainly using people from the the SOUTHERN regional states to make it appear pluralistic. We need though to be careful that they are only minorities. The vast majority of the people of the region are patriotic Ethiopians waiting for the heralding of their day. I my self has some friends from the region who have turned to malignant politicians overnight. Keep on the good work.
Abiye,
I think that is the right approach for an effective fight – a fight that yields fruit. First know how your enemy is fighting you then counter-strategize! Most importantly, do not forget the sources of the power in each department (3 in your triple treat case) so that you may also defeat your enemy by simply drying the source that is supplying its power! Take Care. Have fun!
The problem faced and facing Ethiopia is not the strength of the TPLF kuncho it is the weaknes of the so called opposition and the oppressed people. No one on the earth with military power can rule, the yankees have more army, weapons, money and steel could not win the brave people of Afganistan, they did not in Veitnam. Woyanes strength is overexagerated.
Dear Addis,
Your analysis is so poor it deserves no attention.