René Lefort’s Response To Addis Neger Commenters
I have been surprised that what I saw as the main topic of my article hasn’t been commented by anybody. Shall I consider this as another proof of the gap I mentioned between the politicized urban elite and the mass of the Ethiopian population, the farmers? What I tried to demonstrate was that the outcome of the 2010 elections had been definitively set since the end of 2005, and that it is not mainly due, as commonly explained, to the “weakness” of the opposition, the intensification of the regime’s authoritarianism since 2008 (the laws about NGO’s, the press, “anti-terrorism”), or even the repression of the opposition’s operatives during the electoral campaign.
Your numerous comments on my article prove that at least it dealt with a “hot” issue. I would like to add few comments to your comments, briefly and thus taking the risk of oversimplifying, with the aim of avoiding any misunderstanding, and again led by the necessity of rejecting any ideological presupposition or usual anathema, and of building on hard facts and hard facts only.
1. I have been surprised that what I saw as the main topic of my article hasn’t been commented by anybody. Shall I consider this as another proof of the gap I mentioned between the politicized urban elite and the mass of the Ethiopian population, the farmers? What I tried to demonstrate was that the outcome of the 2010 elections had been definitively set since the end of 2005, and that it is not mainly due, as commonly explained, to the “weakness” of the opposition, the intensification of the regime’s authoritarianism since 2008 (the laws about NGO’s, the press, “anti-terrorism”), or even the repression of the opposition’s operatives during the electoral campaign. Of course, these factors must be taken into account, but essentially to explain why an inescapable defeat has transformed into the EPRDF’s “landslide victory” (here I leave aside the overreaction of the Front’s machinery, due to the zealous of its rank and file members, and the frauds during the vote and the counting).
- From the end of 2004 until a couple of weeks before the 2005 elections day, the rural population experimented for the first time in its history a real electoral competition.
- Due to the incredible absence of the ruling power during most of the campaign and an ascending opposition mainly in the towns, the rural elite (which of course plays the role of “opinion leader” vis-à-vis the population) was able to convince around it that the inescapable winner would be the opposition. For this reason, and this reason above all, it made its first breakthrough in the countryside.
- But it appeared immediately that this vote had been not only useless (“whatever we vote, the EPRDF wins”), but above all detrimental (“we gained nothing”). The rural communities that had voted for the opposition couldn’t turn to their elected representatives to convey their demands to the authorities, as it’s the rule in any democratic representative system. These representatives more than often simply vanished, and in most if not all cases were rendered completely powerless to stand up for their constituency. On the opposite, these communities remained entirely under the same tight control of the same local authorities, of course fully determined to re-establish their absolute ascendancy, while, as ever, their relationship with the latter dictates their access to all the means the state can offer –starting with access to the land- in other words dictates no less than their survival.
- Thus, even at the end of 2005, these opinion leaders reacted in a fully rational way. They claimed they had made “a big mistake” by voting for the opposition, and that the 2005 election had “taught” them they should never do it again. The 2010 election was “cooked” since then.
This has tremendous long-term consequences, which I probably didn’t explain enough. It simply means than in a foreseeable future, these rural opinion leaders will not vote for the opposition and will not campaign for it (this is compulsory if the opposition wants to attract at least a significant part of the mass of the farmers) unless they will be 100% sure that it will win at the national level. I don’t understand how one can debate about any forthcoming evolution of the political landscape without taking this crucial fact into account.
2. After years of investigation in the country side, after having discussed with hundreds of farmers days and nights, I stick to my claim: the majority of the farmers have a world vision in which God is all-powerful, and thus in which the mengist stems from Him. They still feel they are subject, gebar (etymologically: ‘he who is subjected to the drudgery of labour/statute labour’, yesterday by his Lord, today by the mengist). “We are people to be ordered” is a spontaneous say I heard hundreds of times.
I would understand that this assertion would be contested if I would be the only one to forward it. But it is shared by a lot of scholars or experts with an in-depth knowledge of the rural culture. Thus, I strongly believe it must be taken for granted.
Anyway, for those who would still deny it, one can take another way to end up at the same conclusion. Nobody can contest that the local authorities have the power to arbitrarily decide which farmer accesses to fertilizers, credit, etc. and even continues to plough his plot, and which one can be deprived from all these inputs and assets without any appeal. Logically, “you must obey if you want to survive” is also a spontaneous say I heard hundreds of times. Thus the inescapable submissiveness of the overwhelmingly majority of the farmers, stemming either from this age-old mengist arbitrary or from this age-old cultural alienation (I believe from both, which reinforce each other).
Does it mean, as one commentator wrote, that in short I said the Ethiopians are and will remain ruled by God’s will? It’s ridiculous. I never wrote that “the farmers” are enclosed in this over-religious perception, because I know very well that particularly the small fringe of the farmers’ upper group, i.e. the rural elite, has distanced itself from it and desires more and more intensely to access to a full citizenship, even if the present situation prevents this group from becoming concretely active to this end.
But this submissiveness of by far the majority of the Ethiopian population, either forced or accepted, has another tremendous long-term consequence: this rural majority will still not be in a foreseeable future an actor as such of the political game, which therefore will remain confined to a small group of urban dwellers. Here again, I don’t understand how one can debate about any forthcoming evolution of the political landscape without taking this crucial fact into account.
3. Some commentators pointed that I didn’t mention the crucial role of the army and the security apparatus. They are right. I think that Teddy’s remark must be examined seriously: “Meles et. al are very much aware that the moment they loosen their smothering grip on their security machinery their house of cards would come down”. But this role can be considered as crucial only after having answered to the following question: have these forces acquired some degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the EPRDF (in fact the TPLF), or does the politic still remain in full command? Frankly said, I don’t know. The few I know is that:
- The TPLF’s commanders who have taken the control of the army after the dismantling of the army of the Derg will also now progressively retire;
- The junior officers recruited close to 20 years ago should now be automatically promoted to the highest positions, but will these promotions been made regardless of any ethnic criteria or not? Wait and see… The parallel with what will happen inside the EPRDF is obvious;
- These high commanders are entirely involved in the neo-patrimonial system that the EPRDF is building. If this system collapse, they will lose all the advantages they are gaining from it.
4. I would like to add one precision regarding the possible role of armed opposition groups. I entirely share the position of Birtukan Mideksa when she emphasizes that the means design the ends, in other words that a peaceful and democratic regime cannot emerge from a violent struggle.
5. Taking into account my present fields of research, I simply formulated the problem the EPRDF is now facing but without elaborating if and how it could solve it. Nevertheless, I would like to comment two assertions made by Derese Getachew and Lubak.
- Derese Getachew wrote: “Would such an arrangement ( between the old guard and the young Turks) hold or would the young Turks change the course of events and the direction of the Front once they take charge? Lefort is inclined to believe that such a patron-clientelist arrangement could hold given “the deepest sense of hierarchy that runs through the Ethiopian society as a whole”. I disagree”. Derese misunderstood me. I didn’t make any hypothesis regarding the sustainability of such an arrangement. What I said is that, given that these new incomers into the Party largely overlap with the traditional elites and/or the opinions leaders, the Party would be able through this in-building neo-patrimonial system to construct on them a constituency which, taking into account “the deepest sense of hierarchy that runs through the Ethiopian society as a whole”, could be strong enough to be followed by very large parts of the population and so to guarantee it a sustainable hegemony. But I added: at one condition, the “de-ethnicisation” of the EPRDF.
- Lubak wrote: “If TPLF enjoys the benefit of monopoly over everything in the country… I do not think the logic for TPLF to transform into a united national party”. In other words: what could push the TPLF for a more balanced power sharing between the four components of an enlarged EPRDF? I am sure that inside the TPLF, a firm belief exists that the present ethnic bias is not sustainable and can only end into a violent backlash, from which the Front’s members, at least the most notorious, and even simple Tigreans could be the first victims. Which proportion of its militants does share this belief? At which level of responsibility? Will they be as powerful as to re-orient the Front? I don’t know, but the replies to these questions will decisively shape the future of the TPLF, and thus of the regime.
Rene, thank you for the well thought out response to the comments you received from concerned Ethiopians. I completely subscribe to your analysis about the massive conversion and participation of the rural mass into the democratic process in 2005 through the local elite (teachers, local judges, health workers, rural extension workers etc…), for the various reasons you detailed. Furthermore, I also subscribe to your suggestion that, repeating the same feat in the forcible future is next to impossible.
However, I am afraid the above points are what we will agree on as the remaining three or four points are very speculative at best and wishful thinking at worst. To expect the TPLF control mechanism (military, intelligence, security etc…) gradually encompass the majority surely doesn’t reflect what has transpired over the last two decades off TPLF rule. Except few cosmetic changes for political expediency, the TPLF is actually strengthening its strong grip by recruiting exclusively from its domain (Tigerian elite). Furthermore, although there isn’t any empirical evidence to back my claim, I will be surprised if 70-80% of the businesses in Ethiopia are run by TPLF or those that are associated with it such as Al-Modi. This I believe is a fertile ground for rebellion!
Your opposition to armed resistance doesn’t reflect what has happened in places like America after the war of independence etc… What matters isn’t the means used to achieve ones objective, it is whether one has the right objective and sincerity. To that end, I don’t think we have seen any movement in Ethiopia so far, but nevertheless it doesn’t mean we will not see one in the near future. In fact, I know we will see one soon just for the same reasons.
Change comes from very few and determined activist who are willing to pay the necessary sacrifice. So no matter what the odds are, waiting for TPLF to change can’t be an option. After all Ethiopian history is full of unpredicted events occurring, but this time I predict long-lasting change through insurrection movement both urban and rural within the next few years as the conditions are very fertile.
Dear Mr. Lefort,
“ወያኔን ያላረገዘዉን ለዉጥ ውለድ ስንል: ተቃዋሚዎች የቁዋጠሩትን ለውጥ እንዳናስጨነግፍ እንጠንቀቅ::”
I would like to thank you for your well written article: “Ethiopia’s Election: All losers.” I fully agree with most of your analysis of the conditions, processes and outcomes of the Ethiopian Election 2010.
My comment on your article relates to the your assertion that “any internal changes could most probably only come through development within the ruling party itself, given the impotence of the opposition and aid donors’ support the regime” You further said “the political shift by EPRDF and the multiplication of its members has already started a process of change. Added to this is a generation change in leadership, which is inevitable given the advance age of the present encumbrance.”
First, your assumption that an entity called EPRDF exists is wrong. EPDRF is simply TPLF in Ethiopian dress. At least most Ethiopians have reached a “consensus” on this issue and I am sure an independent research (if possible) can prove us right. TPLF uses the name EPRDF as a licence to drive its narrow, primordial and tribal political agenda across the country as this EPRDF umbrella can easily cover its true identity. Put in other words, EPRDF is a licence for TPLF thugs to loot everywhere with impunity. EPRDF is the Cosa Nostra (our thing) of TPLF. Meles Zenawi once said: “if Ethiopia cannot stay together under TPLF leadership, then the country was not meant for unity from the outset.”
Second, while I agree (for the time being) that the “impotence of the opposition and aid donors’ support the regime” hindered democratic and peaceful change in Ethiopia, your assertion that change will come from development in the ruling party; increase in membership and demography (mainly age) is over simplification, lacks empirical evidence and lacks knowledge as to how this minority family group organized. We have to understand that TPLF is the most dangerous anti-Ethiopian group organized like mafia. The inner circle of the group is not mainly related and connected by ideology but by opportunism, marriage, crime and looting. This group and its collaborators know that they have looted public property and massacred thousands of Ethiopians and as a result they fear that internal change endangers the political economy of their survival and will work relentlessly to destroy any internal attitude to change. Further, TPLF is an arrogant and ignorant group that thinks monopoly over the institutions of oppression (arm, security, police, bureaucracy, and media) will keep it in power for ever. As a result, the “internal change hypothesis” cannot not pass TPLF’s Cosa Nostra test.
Third, given the volume of public wealth TPLF directly controls, it can easily co-opt talented and ambitious people to increase the size of its rank-and-file members. However, co-opted members from non-Tigrian ethnic groups are put at the periphery of the Party orbit (far from the inner circle) and these members’ ably to influence the direction and execution of TPLF’s agenda is minimal. Further, TPLF knows that organized members are easily monitorable by its SS/GESTAPO and any anti-TPLF or change attitude can be easily controlled before it damages the inner works of the nucleus political family. This is why the TPLF is running thousands and endless “Gemgamas” (Self-criticism forums) year in year out in the whole country. TPLF will never and ever risk its power base for the sake of Ethiopia or other ethnic groups. This mafia group can do any cosmetic change like (the army is not a member of a party) so long as that change does affect the equation of the power of TPLF core gangsters! As a result, the “demographic change hypothesis” cannot pass the eyes of TPLF’s SS/GESTAPO and “Gimigema” (Self-criticism) test.
Finally, I would like to say that any political change in the county depends on how well the Opposition Parties will organize and lead the struggle rather than the internal and demographic change in the TPLF Cosa Nostra !! Hence, ወያኔን ያላረገዘዉን ለዉጥ ውለድ ስንል: ተቃዋሚዎች የቁዋጠሩትን ለውጥ እንዳናስጨነግፍ: እንጠንቀቅ:: Further, we have to remember that Ethiopia is a country that passes the test of time in its long history!!
Cheers
I don’t think one can argue much with René’s analysis, and I think most commentators are more or less saying the same thing about the current state of politics in Ethiopia.
I just wanted to add something from the prescriptive point of view which is of course the most important thing.
‘Opposition weakness’ very much includes their inability to harness and then build on whatever political capital they had in 2005 or even in 2007. Had they done so, despite repression, they could have done much better in rural areas. S
As everyone now knows, the EPRDF was much more vulnerable during its (more) unpragmatic and unrealistic era. Today, the EPRDF is operating much more efficiently (in terms of politics), and is therefore much harder to dislodge than it has ever been. Thanks, in large part, to the daft opposition.
Today, the opposition have to learn from this and realize that they have even less room for error than before. They must play the game perfectly, or nearly perfectly in order to even make a dent in the system.
Playing perfectly starts with having a truly united front and playing a team game. In terms of strategy, it must focus 1) on the EPRDF’s continued weakness, highlighted by René’s and others’ analyses, which is the constant tug of war between ethnicization and de-ethnicization, and 2) on having policies such as ‘land to the tiller’ (privatization) which in the long run, and we must look at the long run, is a winning political differentiation with the EPRDF.
Dear Rene
I cant agree less with you on the bulk of the analysis you have made.Great job and please do continue to contribute articles and insights not jot to the international media but also outlets like Addis Neger..We need more inputs!!
I still consider the three laws as very instrumental in dictating the outcomes of the election. Even those rural ‘elite’ peasants that have swung public opinion from the opposition to the EPRDF in 2010 have done so, not only out of independent evaluation but because contacting them was difficult for the oppositio, they were being lured, recuuited and by the incumbent ..So the laws were instrumental in shaping the opinion, dictating teh options and influencing the decisions of the rural peasantry as well!!
While I agree that peasants are active human agents, as you said they are constrained by teh structures of the State. This is commonplace in a country like Ethiopia!! I remember having this discussion with you at Gederal Hotel some 6 years back..do you remember that??
Final words, keep the good work up!
Derese
Dear Derese,
O course, I remember this discussion… I simply hope we could get in touch again, as soon as possible, and even better in Addis!
René
Dear all,
Opposition weekness is not only strategic but also problem determination and opinion differences from within the same party. If EPRDF won this election, it’s not because they were strong, but because the opposition was very very week. The main opposition party constituents are simply people who are not born to work together. Should they make a coalition just for the casting ?
René, vu votre nom je pense que vous êtes français. Mais quelle éloquence et quelle connaissance de ce pays si lointain de la France. Soyez présent sur la toile. Merci pour votre article.