In an article, An Oromo Obama:The Audacity to Reinvent Ethiopia, written two years ago, I outlined what I consider were the fault lines of the Oromo ‘colonialism’ narrative. In short, it ignores the central role that Oromos have played in the creation of the modern Ethiopian state. But even for political reasons; the whole notion of seceding from Ethiopia while commanding the respect and voice of the largest ethnic group in the country sounds amusing. In a democratic Ethiopia; be it through the current ethno-federal arrangement or otherwise, candidates who rally the demands and plights of the Oromo public would muster legitimacy and power. I would like to rehash those ideas and project the broader challenges of effecting democratic consensus using “The Minneapolis Compromise” as a backdrop.

Two to Tango

Democratizing the Ethiopian state requires a serious and candid concession on the part of Ethiopian nationalists that regional and ethnic demands should be squarely addressed. Ethiopia cannot go back to the old “Teklay Gizats” and “Kifle Hagers”. Those were administrative divisions with no meaningful political and economic autonomy whose affairs were run by heads single handedly appointed by the Emperor or Chairman Mengistu. In every sense of the term, Ethiopia has been a monolithic state with an absolute control of power and resources at the centre and unyielding to ethnic demands and grievances. It would be a dire miscalculation on the part of the “unionists” to think that they can roll back Ethiopia to what it was before 1991.

The meaning of the Ethiopian state, Ethiopian identity, Ethiopian music, literature, folklore, and tradition should also be broadened. This project looks very similar with what Dr John Garang once dubbed “The New Sudan”. He envisioned a united secular federal and democratic Sudan before his predicament and the subsequent breakup of the Sudan. Ironically, Ethiopia has not gone very far from the times of Wallelign. An anecdote could help me illustrate the case. ETV music hosts usually play Amharic, Oromiyfaa and Tigrigna songs; and then introduce the remaining songs as “የብሄር ብሄረሰቦች ዘፈኖች”! One wonders, what the remaining songs were about.

Ethiopian nationalism is very defensive. It is always alarmed about the risk of being besieged and attacked. The Ogadenis, the Oromos, the Afars, the Eritreans, the Arabs, the Ferenjis are always out to get us. Ethiopian nationalism romanticizes the past priding itself in the yester glories of Axum, Lalibela and Gondar but does not admit its problems of inclusion and representation. If one questions these, he is out to be branded as “የ እናት ጡት ነካሽ” and “ከሃዲ”. The Ethiopian state also has sophisticated channels of control and extraction un-paralleled by any other African state. No wonder Ethiopia survived the colonial onslaught by the West and the rest. It has a superb machinery to organize the public, conscript soldiers, tax and tithe and conduct the affairs of the nation. Such ‘absolutist efficiency’, however, has a dark side. It distrusts the delegation of power and autonomy from the centre to the peripheries. This becomes vivid when the Abyssinian elite discuss the ethno-federal arrangement in Ethiopia.

Many unionists today are skeptical of ethno-federal Ethiopia as a project which puts the country on the brink of state collapse delegating too much power out to the fringes. Funny enough, many ethno-nationalists who work in the regional states (Oromiyaa, Somali, Gambella etc) bitterly complain that the Tigrayans are in charge and call the shots in each region. This is so while the EPRDF basks in the glory of ‘federalizing’ Ethiopia. The truth is the Ethiopian elite find it painfully difficult to bestow power to sub-national entities. Democratizing Ethiopia will be an ominous challenge if the task of federalizing it and attending ethnic and regional sensitivities is not seriously undertaken. Discussions with such actors like the OLF or ONLF therefore demand concessions on the part of the unionists. Compromise is a two-way traffic.

The “Minneapolis Compromise”

Here, I would like to recognize that the debate about the “Oromo question” and its fate in relation to the Ethiopian state has been a subject of household discussion among the Oromo elite itself. Recently, moderate voices about addressing the Oromo question are becoming loud and persuasive. We also heard about negotiations undertaken by the Ginbot 7 leadership and OLF factions (I don’t know how many factions are out there) about policy matters. Any Ethiopian from any political dispensation should welcome such moves and gestures NOT because G7 and OLF are the “sole and legitimate representatives” of non-Oromos and Oromos respectively. In lieu, they command significant following and posture in the opposition camp. Even if they do not, we welcome their moves as fellow concerned citizens.

Compromise is also imperative on the part of ethno-nationalists. And yes, the Oromo elite, in general, and the OLF leadership, in particular, should play a leading and constructive role in effecting regime change in Ethiopia. But Oromo nationalism is very defensive too. First, the griots of Oromo historiography (save for the seasoned works of Prof Mohammed Hassen) are unwilling to accept the role of the Oromo people in the history of the modern day Ethiopia. Secondly, many Oromo nationalists denounce and undermine the role of the Amhara, Tigrayan, Guraghe, Somali and many more students and progressives who rallied against national oppression in Ethiopia. Those vibrant and genuinely progressive non-Oromo Ethiopians are summarily dismissed as Abyssinian apologists who never cared for the plight of the Oromo. Instead, they are charged for sabotaging and undermining the national struggle for liberation dodging it under the rubric of class struggle and Marxism Leninism.

Even more, Oromos who felt and argued the “Oromo question” could be addressed alongside other fellow Ethiopians were branded as “Gobenists”, “Saboteurs” and “Fidists” (after the prominent MEISON leader Haile Fida). Today, those non-Oromos who argue that democratizing the Ethiopian state are dismissed by many Oromo nationalists as “chauvinist Abyssinians” disguising themselves as “democrats”. This has become apparent from the writings of many Oromo nationalists following the recent announcement of an OLF faction. For these people, democracy is a buzz word meant to reinstate Abyssinian domination by the back door. The euphoria and grandstanding in the Ethiopianist media about the declarations of Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu’s faction has, if anything, emboldened such radicals. They are waving their index fingers at the moderates saying, “We told you so!”

The fact that a faction of the OLF is considering to redefine its struggle from secession to building a democratic and federal Ethiopia is noteworthy. But the move is too little too soon! First, the official statement of Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu’s faction and its announcement to struggle for self determination among fellow Ethiopians was not clear enough. It was not obvious whether the faction has decided to explicitly drop ‘secession’ as one potential outcome of that struggle for self determination. Secondly, such move would have made a lot more sense if all the factions and senior leaders within the OLF were involved. This decision is very fundamental to an organization that always defined itself on the discourse of ‘liberation”, “national struggle”, “self determination” and “secession”. Doing so requires making sure everyone is on board, reaching consensus, and working through organizational procedures like general assemblies. That is why I call the compromise “too little” (a move by a small faction) and “too soon”.

The irony is that many news websites and Ethiopianist politicians keep referring to the decision of this faction as a “historic decision” of the entire OLF! This is simply disingenuous. Last but not least, the unity camp should have been more careful about the tone it sets. What we witnessed from the Ethiopianist camp were not sighs of relief but triumphalist cheers and jubilations. I remember a headline that read, “OLF admitted its Ethiopianness” (ኦነግ ኢትዮጵያዊነቱን አምኖ.). What would Oromos who struggled for equality, respect and dignity in Ethiopia feel when they read such announcements? And put this in a context where Oromos always suffered from pejorative and chauvinistic epithets and remarks portraying them as gullible. Nobody deserves accolades for ‘proselytizing’ Oromo nationalists as Ethiopians. For me, they are Ethiopians who have a different opinion of Ethiopia! People should have foreseen the possibility of a backlash and be more modest when treating this news. All said, this very incident reminds us of the fact that grounding a “centre left” position in Ethiopia’s politics is such a formidable challenge. It is a tortoise walk to compromise.

In an article, An Oromo Obama:The Audacity to Reinvent Ethiopia, written two years ago, I outlined what I consider were the fault lines of the Oromo ‘colonialism’ narrative. In short, it ignores the central role that Oromos have played in the creation of the modern Ethiopian state. But even for political reasons; the whole notion of seceding from Ethiopia while commanding the respect and voice of the largest ethnic group in the country sounds amusing. In a democratic Ethiopia; be it through the current ethno-federal arrangement or otherwise, candidates who rally the demands and plights of the Oromo public would muster legitimacy and power. I would like to rehash those ideas and project the broader challenges of effecting democratic consensus using “The Minneapolis Compromise” as a backdrop.

Two to Tango

Democratizing the Ethiopian state requires a serious and candid concession on the part of Ethiopian nationalists that regional and ethnic demands should be squarely addressed. Ethiopia cannot go back to the old “Teklay Gizats” and “Kifle Hagers”. Those were administrative divisions with no meaningful political and economic autonomy whose affairs were run by heads single handedly appointed by the Emperor or Chairman Mengistu. In every sense of the term, Ethiopia has been a monolithic state with an absolute control of power and resources at the centre and unyielding to ethnic demands and grievances. It would be a dire miscalculation on the part of the “unionists” to think that they can roll back Ethiopia to what it was before 1991.

The meaning of the Ethiopian state, Ethiopian identity, Ethiopian music, literature, folklore, and tradition should also be broadened. This project looks very similar with what Dr John Garang once dubbed “The New Sudan”. He envisioned a united secular federal and democratic Sudan before his predicament and the subsequent breakup of the Sudan. Ironically, Ethiopia has not gone very far from the times of Wallelign. An anecdote could help me illustrate the case. ETV music hosts usually play Amharic, Oromiyfaa and Tigrigna songs; and then introduce the remaining songs as “የብሄር ብሄረሰቦች ዘፈኖች”! One wonders, what the remaining songs were about.

Ethiopian nationalism is very defensive. It is always alarmed about the risk of being besieged and attacked. The Ogadenis, the Oromos, the Afars, the Eritreans, the Arabs, the Ferenjis are always out to get us. Ethiopian nationalism romanticizes the past priding itself in the yester glories of Axum, Lalibela and Gondar but does not admit its problems of inclusion and representation. If one questions these, he is out to be branded as “የ እናት ጡት ነካሽ” and “ከሃዲ”. The Ethiopian state also has sophisticated channels of control and extraction un-paralleled by any other African state. No wonder Ethiopia survived the colonial onslaught by the West and the rest. It has a superb machinery to organize the public, conscript soldiers, tax and tithe and conduct the affairs of the nation. Such ‘absolutist efficiency’, however, has a dark side. It distrusts the delegation of power and autonomy from the centre to the peripheries. This becomes vivid when the Abyssinian elite discuss the ethno-federal arrangement in Ethiopia.

Many unionists today are skeptical of ethno-federal Ethiopia as a project which puts the country on the brink of state collapse delegating too much power out to the fringes. Funny enough, many ethno-nationalists who work in the regional states (Oromiyaa, Somali, Gambella etc) bitterly complain that the Tigrayans are in charge and call the shots in each region. This is so while the EPRDF basks in the glory of ‘federalizing’ Ethiopia. The truth is the Ethiopian elite find it painfully difficult to bestow power to sub-national entities. Democratizing Ethiopia will be an ominous challenge if the task of federalizing it and attending ethnic and regional sensitivities is not seriously undertaken. Discussions with such actors like the OLF or ONLF therefore demand concessions on the part of the unionists. Compromise is a two-way traffic.

The “Minneapolis Compromise”

Here, I would like to recognize that the debate about the “Oromo question” and its fate in relation to the Ethiopian state has been a subject of household discussion among the Oromo elite itself. Recently, moderate voices about addressing the Oromo question are becoming loud and persuasive. We also heard about negotiations undertaken by the Ginbot 7 leadership and OLF factions (I don’t know how many factions are out there) about policy matters. Any Ethiopian from any political dispensation should welcome such moves and gestures NOT because G7 and OLF are the “sole and legitimate representatives” of non-Oromos and Oromos respectively. In lieu, they command significant following and posture in the opposition camp. Even if they do not, we welcome their moves as fellow concerned citizens.

Compromise is also imperative on the part of ethno-nationalists. And yes, the Oromo elite, in general, and the OLF leadership, in particular, should play a leading and constructive role in effecting regime change in Ethiopia. But Oromo nationalism is very defensive too. First, the griots of Oromo historiography (save for the seasoned works of Prof Mohammed Hassen) are unwilling to accept the role of the Oromo people in the history of the modern day Ethiopia. Secondly, many Oromo nationalists denounce and undermine the role of the Amhara, Tigrayan, Guraghe, Somali and many more students and progressives who rallied against national oppression in Ethiopia. Those vibrant and genuinely progressive non-Oromo Ethiopians are summarily dismissed as Abyssinian apologists who never cared for the plight of the Oromo. Instead, they are charged for sabotaging and undermining the national struggle for liberation dodging it under the rubric of class struggle and Marxism Leninism.

Even more, Oromos who felt and argued the “Oromo question” could be addressed alongside other fellow Ethiopians were branded as “Gobenists”, “Saboteurs” and “Fidists” (after the prominent MEISON leader Haile Fida). Today, those non-Oromos who argue that democratizing the Ethiopian state are dismissed by many Oromo nationalists as “chauvinist Abyssinians” disguising themselves as “democrats”. This has become apparent from the writings of many Oromo nationalists following the recent announcement of an OLF faction. For these people, democracy is a buzz word meant to reinstate Abyssinian domination by the back door. The euphoria and grandstanding in the Ethiopianist media about the declarations of Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu’s faction has, if anything, emboldened such radicals. They are waving their index fingers at the moderates saying, “We told you so!”

The fact that a faction of the OLF is considering to redefine its struggle from secession to building a democratic and federal Ethiopia is noteworthy. But the move is too little too soon! First, the official statement of Brigadier General Kemal Gelchu’s faction and its announcement to struggle for self determination among fellow Ethiopians was not clear enough. It was not obvious whether the faction has decided to explicitly drop ‘secession’ as one potential outcome of that struggle for self determination. Secondly, such move would have made a lot more sense if all the factions and senior leaders within the OLF were involved. This decision is very fundamental to an organization that always defined itself on the discourse of ‘liberation”, “national struggle”, “self determination” and “secession”. Doing so requires making sure everyone is on board, reaching consensus, and working through organizational procedures like general assemblies. That is why I call the compromise “too little” (a move by a small faction) and “too soon”.

The irony is that many news websites and Ethiopianist politicians keep referring to the decision of this faction as a “historic decision” of the entire OLF! This is simply disingenuous. Last but not least, the unity camp should have been more careful about the tone it sets. What we witnessed from the Ethiopianist camp were not sighs of relief but triumphalist cheers and jubilations. I remember a headline that read, “OLF admitted its Ethiopianness” (ኦነግ ኢትዮጵያዊነቱን አምኖ.). What would Oromos who struggled for equality, respect and dignity in Ethiopia feel when they read such announcements? And put this in a context where Oromos always suffered from pejorative and chauvinistic epithets and remarks portraying them as gullible. Nobody deserves accolades for ‘proselytizing’ Oromo nationalists as Ethiopians. For me, they are Ethiopians who have a different opinion of Ethiopia! People should have foreseen the possibility of a backlash and be more modest when treating this news. All said, this very incident reminds us of the fact that grounding a “centre left” position in Ethiopia’s politics is such a formidable challenge. It is a tortoise walk to compromise.