EPRDF’s Courage to Reinvent : A Rejoinder to Rene Lefort’s Piece
I will not be surprised if the Front transforms itself to a united national party along the lines of CCP, CCM, BDP or its immediate Ethiopian predecessor, the WPE! Given its record of staggering pragmatism (Remember the premier’s frequent remark that EPRDF never repeats its mistakes!), the Front does have the courage to reinvent itself like this. This may turn the table on all pan-Ethiopian opposition parties pulling the carpet from beneath, while satiating the ethno-nationalists by retaining the current ethno-federal structure of the country. The massive influx of the urban voters to support (be it out of conviction or provision) and comprise the EPRDF could serve as one possible trigger of such a phenomenon. The jury is out to find the verdict but still all eyes are on Leviathan.
Rene Lefort’s analysis of the 2010 election in Ethiopia is such a refreshing piece. While it offers a comprehensive analysis of pre-election conditions that led to the inevitable outcome, the last three or four paragraphs of the article discussed possible scenarios of future political transition in Ethiopia. EPRDF’s win didn’t come as a surprise to anyone. The fall out and division of the Ethiopian opposition in the wake of 2005;the promulgation of stringent laws on party registration and operation, civil society organizations and terrorism; EPRDF’s take on members recruitment, indoctrination and mobilization; have all shown that the writing was on the wall. If anything, all of us were waiting to see EPRDF’s ‘margin of victory’ and the consolation prize it leaves for the vanquished. A 99.96 % victory-that took everyone by surprise!
As Mr. Beyene Petros fittingly put it, any rational victor who relishes the idea of Ethiopia as a democratic and developmental state “would leave the door ajar”. This time around only two candidates made it to the national parliament whose door slammed shut on the hesitant well wishers. Much ink has now been spilled on whether this victory was calculated or something that came to the surprise of the incumbents themselves. Honestly speaking, this is immaterial. The next five years are now signed, sealed and delivered to EPRDF that single handedly controls the Parliament. Call it ironic, but one cannot wait to see the sessions of the next Ethiopian parliament and the ‘discussions’ it will hold. I can also imagine how easy the work of the next Speaker of the House as well as the Chief Whip of EPRDF would be, unlike the ‘challenges’ of the former speaker to conduct hearings (especially when the Prime Minister was summoned).
Many have argued that the election outcome would embolden those groups that advocate armed struggle against the incumbent. Lefort is quick to point out that groups such as the OLF had ‘persistent weaknesses of leadership’ and others like the Ethiopian People’s Patriotic Front have not “found the leverage to mobilize a peasant army’. Considering the support of the international community for the regime as a strategic ally against the war on terrorism and the ‘combatants’ poor choice of a regional ally, we can safely argue that a rural based peasant insurrection against the EPRDF is a remote possibility. A question then comes to mind. Where would the next political moment come from? What could possibly effect regime change with systemic power shifts? I agree with Rene Lefort that the internal dynamics of the EPRDF would now be the most decisive factor. Acknowledging this, we can entertain the following three possible scenarios.
The ranks of the EPRDF have swollen with thousands of new recruits throughout the country. Preparations are underway to ensure a gradual but collective transfer of leadership from the old guards to the young Turks of the Front. One option for the Front would be to develop an institutional arrangement where the old guards would direct the ideological and political trajectory of the party behind the scenes while leaving the drudgery of everyday politics to the newcomers. Given the multiethnic nature of the Front itself and possible competition of the elite from member parties, the Front may settle for a permanent internal modus operandi that would oversee similar transitions in its life cycle. Ethnic membership, experience in party assignments, dedication and discipline to party principles would presumably feature as criteria to select and ordain the new faces of the EPRDF.
Would such an arrangement hold or would the young Turks change the course of events and the direction of the Front once they take charge? Lefort is inclined to believe that such a patron-clientelist arrangement could hold given “the deepest sense of hierarchy that runs through the Ethiopian society as a whole”. I disagree. Time and again, negotiated transitions of power have brought unpleasant surprises to the predecessors. The disappointments of Vladmir Putin (Russia), Olusegun Obasanjo(Nigeria) or Bakili Muluzi( Malawi) are cases in point here. Medvediyev, Umaru Yar Adua and Bingu Wa Mutharika did not become timid and powerless proteges once they assumed power from their predecessors. The idea of co-opting ‘horses for courses’ could, therefore, backfire simply because human beings are active and rational agents.
This is more so for a broad coalition of ethnically organized fronts like the EPRDF where succession is not simply a matter of personality choices but also ethnic allegiance. It is far different than parties like the Chinese Communist Party whose ethnic constitution is dominated by the Han Chinese, the overwhelming ethnic majority (more than 80%) of the nation. Neither are we talking of a scenario where EPRDF is a monolithic party organized under a pan-Ethiopian nationalist umbrella (as was the case for the WPE). A very good example of the latter would be the Chama Chama Mpunizi (CCM) of Tanzania whose Marxist Leninist leanings were reformed in the 1990s but its firm national grip of Tanzania’s politics continued even after the introduction of multi-party democracy. CCM is a classic case of one- party dominance but where intra-party transitions have always been peaceful and negotiated. Julius Nyerere was succeeded by Ali Hassan Mwini followed by Benjamin Mukapa and the incumbent Jakaya Kikwete. CCM’s intra-party transitions were a success partly because ethnic allegiance was strongly discouraged as factionalism. It was undermined by some deliberate policies of CCM, beginning from the times of the Mwalimu himself. We have a totally different scenario with the EPRDF where the ethnic card is a cardinal element of the coalition itself. Hence, we can expect a power loci shift from the TPLF to the other members (notably OPDO or ANDM) along with the ‘kibibilosh’ from the old guards to the young Turks. What are the stakes in such ‘kibibilosh’? Too many.
Here is a wild shot in the dark; my last probable scenario. Given the evolution of the TPLF from an ethno-national liberation movement to EPRDF; its ideological revisions from Marxism Leninism to ‘embracing’ multi-party democracy and pro-western policies; its occasional flirtations with Ethiopian nationalism( as was in the case of the Ethio-Eritrean war, the Somali intervention, and the Millennium celebrations); and most of all its passion for the ‘developmental state’ model of the NICs, China and Botswana; I will not be surprised if the Front transforms itself to a united national party along the lines of CCP, CCM, BDP or its immediate Ethiopian predecessor, the WPE! Given its record of staggering pragmatism (Remember the premier’s frequent remark that EPRDF never repeats its mistakes!), the Front does have the courage to reinvent itself like this. This may turn the table on all pan-Ethiopian opposition parties pulling the carpet from beneath, while satiating the ethno-nationalists by retaining the current ethno-federal structure of the country. The massive influx of the urban voters to support (be it out of conviction or provision) and comprise the EPRDF could serve as one possible trigger of such a phenomenon. The jury is out to find the verdict but still all eyes are on Leviathan.
I think much, if not all depends on how those new urban voters pan out. If they are committed to EPRDF then something like a CCM in Tanzania might occur. If they are merely pragmatists, then the question becomes on what are they NOT pragmatists. What, if anything, do they really care about politically. I wouldn’t want to hazard a guess at this point
Three points:
1. You completely discounted that the real power of EPRDF lies in its control of the military and the security apparatus. A power loci shift from the TPLF to other members would have to be accompanied by a similar shift in the army and security if your guess is to be plausible.There is no such shift in the two institutions(and for a reason). The stakes of the Kibiblosh are not as many and high as you claimed.
2. Even if there is a power loci shift within all the major institutions of power, it is difficult to say the outcome might be as you suggested. Occasional flirtation of nationalism aside, there is little to suggest that there is a nationalist current in the non-TPLF members of the coalition. A cursory look at the composition of OPDO members and mid-level young leaders suggests otherwise.
3. While I agree that the idea of coopting horses for courses may backfire(in the case of Medevedev, it really didn’t despite what you said), backfiring doesn’t necessarily mean structural and ideological transformation. It is worth nothing that in most of the successful reinventions you mentioned, the kibebilosh were largely the functions of the already ongoing transformations in the political parties, not vice versa.
Well, thank you, Abiye. There is hope, after all.
One question before trying to comment the previous comments: I don’t understand what “kibebilosh” means…
It means passing the torch.
I find Rene Lefort’s diagnosis of the 2010 Ethiopian elections to be far-fetched in which he was at pains to make sweeping generalisations on the basis of certain anecdotal evidence. His aetiology on the shortcomings of electoral politics barely spared anyone to the extent that the majority of the population ‘have a vision of the world where absolutely everything is determined by divine will’. In order to force his rather loosely substantiated conclusions, Lefort had to discredit arguably the most viable factors which ensured EPRDF hegemony of the Ethiopian political scene.
In contrast to his assertions, the 2010 opposition is by far weaker than what we witnessed in 2005. The imprisonment of Birtukan Mideksa, extremely narrow space for debates among political parties, harassment and killings of opposition party members took their toll on the ability of the opposition to stage meaningful participation. Lefort does not buy this argument, unfortunately, because we Ethiopians are informed a priori by divine power about the identity of our rulers.
Lefort did not bother to give us any plausible explanation when he dismissed the significance of EPRDF’s repressive laws on the outcome of the recent elections in the country. His prognosis borders between the impractical and the ridiculous. Our hope, according to Lefort, lies in cementing a neo-patrimonial regime. With all due respect to Derese, this is anything but refreshing. I hope to say more on the supposed transformation of the EPRDF.
Thank you to you as well, sir.
I have great respect for Mr. Lefort. But I have serious issues with his recent article. It seems that he feels he has mastered the psyche of the Ethiopian farmer after spending a couple of months with some farmers in Northern Shewa. But not all Ethiopians share the belief that “the almighty assigns the ruler”. Many other issues in there…
How on earth you equate Tplf/Eprdf’s war with Eritrea and the Somali intervention with nationalism? It is a series flaw in understanding the modus operandi of the Tplf from its inception. Let alone a series writer like you, anybody who cares to know TPLF’s political history would know that the group doesn’t have any principle. From Albania style leninism (1985-1991) to Liberal Democracy (1991-2001), white Capitalism (2001-2005) and now Revolutionary Democracy and developmental state Chinese style. The Tplf would cling to anything that suits it and would do anything and evrything to stay in power. In fact Tplf and principle are oxymoron. Anybody who entertains the idea that TPLF would abonden the divide and rule ethnic politics is either doesn’t know TPLF or a daydreamer. The Tplf can not survive without ethnic politics. It is not out of principle but they think it is the only way to divide and rule a big nation like Ethiopia.
Few observations here. Post-Meles politics in Ethiopia will see a far more dominant role by the military in politics. The period will also witness a possible weakening of the position of the Prime Minster as EPRDF may chose a safe candidate from some of its less dominant wings. One should also expect the possiblity of ‘democratisation’( a slow reversal of democratic centeralism) and fierce power competition from within as centers of power emerge.
The future of EPRDF and indeed the country hinges upon how EPRDF will arbiter competing interests and conflicts. No one is mentioning the fact that more than anything else, international developments pretty much conspire with local realities to bring change in Ethiopia(bad or good). This is not fully explored, i think.
Dear Derese,
First of all, there is no EPRDF –It is TPLF with a false Ethiopian umbrella. The other are either teletafis or “prisoner of Injera.” Given this understanding of mine, change in the so called EPPRDF needs a fundamental change in the ethno-communist and fascist thinking of the TPLF leadership. The Zenawi’s statement that “EPRDF never repeats its mistakes” is absolutely nonsense and is not accompanied by any evidence.
The greatest mistake it did was to steal the 2005 election. And in 2010 it repeated its mistake by even claiming 546 seats in a 547 Parliament. To me TPLF does not only repeat its mistakes but it has institutionalized mistakes and lies in all its structures and manifestation. TPLF has the courage to change but change to be more authoritarian and ethno-fascism to protect the interest of its “new class” in the name of a Tigrians.
In addition to the military and security apparatus, TPLF has a monopoly of other institutions of oppression in the country and has already institutionalized tribalism and racism in all these structures:
1. Monopoly over the bureaucracy
2. Monopoly over the media
3. Monopoly over the justice system
4. Monopoly over the economy, finance, etc
5. Monopoly over parliament
6. Monopoly over executive branch of government
7. Monopoly over the state structure from Federal to Kebeles an in some cases household
8. Absolute monopoly over Teletafis and Hodams
If TPLF enjoys the benefit of monopoly over everything in the country and use this monopoly position to unleash commit heinous crime to stay in power, I do not think the logic for TPLF to transform into a united national party. A united national party is against the very existence of TPLF. In fact, for TPLF, EPRDF is a United National Party!!!
Milovan Djilas once said “the strongest are those who renounce their own times and become a living part of those yet to come. The strongest and the rarest.”
Unfortunately, TPLF is neither the strongest nor the rarest creation to face its mistakes as we have witnessed for the past 20 years!
My problem is not with the Front’s schedule to pass the torch; we expect by September that many old leaders would retire-the first batch(?) and goes on to the last phase of the next 5 yrs when we have to find the PM will be leaving space. Here comes my problem? My problem is to find a well-cultivated substitutor to the place of the Party head, Meles. As far as I am concerned, the blood and veins of the Front are concerted because of the person’s extraordinary capability (good or bad)to work and rework things according to immediate demands. Then, do we have any one for such roles? As some already, underscored, should there be any meaningful ‘Kibiblosh’-two things need to be addressed: the role of the army (the composition of its leadership) and the place of Ethiopia in international politics namely in the fight against terrorism-which would I believe would be acute in the Horn in the coming years!
I am surprised that such an erudite piece would define the present ruling arrangement as multiethnic (“the multiethnic nature of the Front itself”). I thought that the intellectual conversation about the nature of the present regime had been resolved a long time ago. The present regime is composed of TPLF representing a master ethnic group encircled by a constellation of client groups that it spawned at various periods as it morphed from a group of half-baked sophomores leading dupes of bumpkin peasants to the ruling power that it is at present. Any discussion about it being a “coalition”, “multiethnic “ or any other epithet is a mere subterfuge that will only serve to excavate a long settled point and bring forth a debate which would be a disservice to the cause of understanding the innate characteristics of the system. Those who now stalk along the corridor of power in pin-stripe suits are only there because they are on the right side of the ethnic divide. They are not there because of their merit or as an outcome of a negotiated settlement among the groups belonging to a genuine coalition. Would the author of this article doubt this fact?
Back fire on the “Idea of Co-opting” is ont well realized since there are two extremes on the opposite side of the scale the stablized living of the victim of cooption vs the rationalist belief for betterment of the totality .If the later weigh more then the outcome will be well founded
I agree with the point made by Abiye regarding the unwavering grip of the TPLF regime on the security apparatus as its major means if not the only means of sustaining its hold on power. This clearly is explainable given the hard core of the ruling party represent a small minority of the total population. (I hope you would not ask me about the popularity of OPDO and ANDM as that would be farcical) And they know that they would easily be trashed in any credible election organized in line with their ethnic-based voting system. Coming to the newly coined ‘metekakat’ idea, it would not be difficult to predict what the PM Meles and his crew are planning to do knowing that they have no real plans to relinquish their power to some political novices and would make sure that those coming to assume power are ‘of their own’. To achieve that they would make all the purges in the higher circles in the same manner as they cleansed the higher circles of the army and security apparatus (following the attempted ‘coup’ by the Ginbout 7 group). This would make the environment ready for passing the torch in a way that maintains the status quo guarding TPLF’s politico-military domination. Meles et. al are very much aware that the moment they loosen their smothering grip on their security machinery their house of cards would come down crumbling to the ground. Hence the reason why they keep the command of the army essentially Tigrayan and avoid granting real powers to army generals from other ethnic groups. I have personally hear more alarming arguments by army officers of the Ethiopian Army about the prevailing sitaution with in the army does not warrant it being called a national army considering the total dominance of the TPLF, its allegiance being to the TPLF core leadership and the lack of institutionalism.
I am always amused when people try to do academic analysis of EPRDF structure and policy as if EPRDF represents a legitimate ideology or organization. It is like assuming the mafia has a legitimate ideology worth discussing in academic circles. The true nature of EPRDF is obvious it did not change since it took power in 1991. Simply stated staying in power by whatever means necessary. It is as criminal organization as the mafia is. In realty EPRDF is just a cover the real power behind EPRDF is the narrow nationalist TPLF gang. The rest of the organizations in EPRDF are not even worth mentioning as political organizations. The apt Amharic word is teletafi. With the exception of Addisu Legese’s organization the rest were formed either on the eve of TPLF taking power or immediately after. All incubated and hatched by TPLF. Why TPLF did this is simple. For the alleged liberators of nation and nationalities it did not look good to foreign donors and internal consumption that the nation is ruled by a single ethnic organization TPLF. Thus this smoke screen of a government by a coalition of ethnic groups. In reality there is no coalition it is TPLF. TPLF always went to any length to stay in power. They started out as hardliner Marxists during the soviet era. After the fall of the Soviet Union and they knew that they have to align with the west, they were the foremost democrats of the American type. Now they think the tide is turning and their future lies with the Chinese, we hear this revolutionary democracy nonsense. There was no way they would have advocated this when they relied heavily on the Americans. In their early years when they were dependent on EPLF, their hatred of Ethiopia and anything Ethiopian surpassed that of the EPLF. The flag the nation and the people, they hated it all. Even in their early years of power before they broke off from EPLF they were defenders of EPLF interest more than anyone. They used EPLF and its supporters to consolidate their grip on power. Once that is done and they were less dependent on EPLF, they discarded it. The Ethiopian nationalism of TPLF displayed during the war with Eritrea was because to win the war and rally support they have to look nationalist. That was all. The true color of TPLF is the same a criminal gang no better than any of the criminals that are running Africa. There interest is power for ever nothing else. This is a criminal gang not and ideologically driven or principled group. They are as pragmatic as a criminal gang. This is the true nature of TPLF aka EPRDF.
It is surprising to see when people think that EPRDF is bigger than TPLF. That assuption is ignoring the reality. All organizations under the umbrella of EPRDF are powerless and have no siginficant power even to decided on their own internal political affairs let alone influencing TPLF in any way. The political power obviously consolidated even more by single individual, Meles Zenawi. By now, it should be clear all potential retirees including TPLF veterans like Mesfin have lost even the miniscule pwoer they enjoyed when they were TPLF proper. The “kebelosh” is passing all battons to Meles nothingelse. That is why no other potential leader emerged so far in TPLF or EPRDF circle. What we have been observing so far is conolidation of power to one man. The mystery is if this has happened with the free will of the potential competitors (TPLF vetrans) or they were so powerless but comply and cooperate to do what they have been asked to do. Ask, how did Meles does it?
Dear Oda,
I fully agree with your description of TPLF or the fake EPRDF!!
Your question “how did Meles does it?” can be better understood through how exactly Mengistu did it.
You know that 120 arm officers were selected to represent the entire Army and police. They called themselves DERGUE that had equal representational powe. But all of a sudden Mengistu came out and start issuing order and the 119 members willingly accepted the authority of Mengistu. Mengistu used this created image and authority to further consolidate his power by brutally killing his former colleagues and “opponents.” That is exactly what Zenawi is doing!!
I feel that a couple of issues have dominated this vital discussion on the possible trajectory which EPRDF is likely to take in the coming period. The first one is the increasing autocratic nature of the regime. This has actually become a truism. Additionally, the political decay which EPRDF finds itself in is an irredeemable one.
I totally agree with the first one while not entirely with the second one. I believe that a political change which comes at the complete annihilation of the EPRDF is unproductive and self-destructive. I pinpoint a few reasons to rationalise my admittedly unpopular stance:
• One striking similarity between the EPRDF and the DERG is that both systematically locked-in the survival and legitimacy of the state with their own tenure. To put differently, DERG kept repeating the imminent secession of Eritrea if it is forced out of power. That occurred because, despite its endless slogans, its policies eroded what makes a state a legitimate one. EPRDF holds the country at ransom in case a real threat to its power emerges. Recall how the ugly face of tribalism spearheaded by EPRDF itself gained momentum during the weeks and months after EPRDF received a battering at polls in 2005 at the hands of CUD. I am not preaching a policy of appeasement towards the EPRDF. I am just expressing my anxiety that in our drive to remove the EPRDF we might as well lose the state of Ethiopia itself. Let us not make our country a textbook case of a badly-managed a common good resource.
• Democratic transitions could occur through at least four ways; namely through transformations (where ruling elites lead the change), replacements (where opposition groups bring about changes), transplacements (where joint action by those in power and opposition force change), and interventions (where it is imposed by outside forces). These are very intuitive which you and I can figure out. But, for the record, these statements are credited to Samuel P. Huntington. I do not believe that such a highly fragmented opposition in Ethiopia is capable of bringing change and/or if the change ensures a stable administration for the foreseeable future. I do not think also about the plausibility of outside intervention. Look how the more repressive EPRDF has become the more foreign aid it manages to mobilise. Transplacement is possible though I am apprehensive of the opposition’s capability to stage a common front. Transformation is a different story. Given the Ethiopian political culture, it is very unlikely that the new generation of EPRDF leaders might not be ‘clones’ of the old guard. What we as citizens might have to do is to give this group a credible commitment which ensures that political reforms do not necessarily come at their expense.
• As a matter of principle, I disagree with situations in which only roles of ‘victors’ and ‘vanquished’ are reversed. Whatever we call them, EPRDF has created a sizeable constituency during its armed struggle as well as when it has been at the helm of power. A politics of exclusivity (for instance through a complete abandonment of the Constitution) is set to create a dissatisfied group which is intent to use every means, including violence, to achieve its political goals. This type of vicious circle in Ethiopian politics caused hundreds of thousands (if not millions) of deaths and economic stagnation. It is high time ideology gives way to realpolitik in which ‘sleeping with the enemy’ may be the sensible thing to do. We might start by giving the ‘metekakat’ a serious consideration.
I think everyone here is hitting on the critical point: The EPRDF’s achilles heel is its ethnic-based organization. An ethnic-based organization dominated by a minority is certain to fall in the long run! This is why the pragmatists in the EPRDF woke up and decided to change the party from the ‘ethnic party’ to ‘the party of development’.
It’s worked, but only a little bit, as the party is in fact and perception still little more than the TPLF. But how to work around this? How to keep a fine balance between 1) keeping Tigrean power safe, 2) satisfying the ethnic nationalists in the party, and yet 3) not traveling an ethnic-based course that would result in danger in the long run.
It seems to me that they’ve decided that in order to survive in the long run, they have no choice but to move towards 1) more pluralism / less Tigrean domination and 2) less narrow nationalism, and just keep control of the military. A wise decision – they have no choice – this is the most rational strategy.
But I agree with Derese and others – even this cannot continue in the long run. Eventually, they’ll have to start to bring pluralism to the military as well.
They’re probably hoping that time and prolonged economic growth will continue to emasculate ethnic nationalists and change the perception of the EPRDF as an ethnic party, so that in time people will actually freely support the EPRDF!
Well, we’ll see. But the EPRDF’s slow move away from governance based on ideology and bitterness towards pragmatism is good. If only the opposition would do the same. Sigh.
I should add here, in case some haven’t noticed, that much of the ‘credit’, for the EPRDF’s pragmatic swing goes to Ethiopia. Despite a turbulent Zemene Mesafint, followed by brief monarchic stability, and then a devastating Dergue and a bitter, divisive EPRDF, the country ‘refused’ to capitulate. Instead, it has forced the EPRDF to change and adopt itself to the real Ethiopia, not the Ethiopia it thought it knew in the jungle.
Dear All,
Again a number of insightful and critical observations on this ‘futurist’ article which aims to project but with little at hand. The writer, if anything, is a distant observer of the Front which has ruled the country for more than two-third of his life on planet earth.Very little research is done on the ideological, organisational and factional divisions and alignments of the EPRDF itself, partly because it is one of the most opaque and secretive organizations in Africa!!
For all those who raised concerns about Lefort’s analysis of the election. I do not think he argued that the opposition is far more united and stronger than 2005. He only p ointed out the MEDERK was at least a broad church of ethno-nationalist and unionis organizations which tried to chart compromise position on two critical policy issues: land and the national question. THis he was arguing could have made them more appealing than the CUD -UEDF divides in 2005. That did not happend for a number of reasons he outlined, one wof which is the apparent fall out and division of the oppoistion, the laws passed and EPRDF’s own aggrtessive recruitment and indoctrination work! I admit, however, his generalization about the Ethiopian peasants and their dispsoition to divine will and apathy for politics may sound a little exaggerated.But even there, he showed that peasants depend on the state for almost everything from fertilizers to the very land itself. So I think some commentators have taken his writing out of context. let us give him where credit is due!
Nobody denies that TPLF is the founder and the most dominant party within the EPRDF. It has played the leading role in the creation and reoroganization of the other member parties within the coalition( OPDO, ANDM etc). The TPLF chair is the chair of the Front and the government. But to argue that the leaders of those organisations are completely ‘powerless’ is to assume far too much!! Even a ‘client’ may have the ambition to be the ‘patron’, given the opportunity. Wranglings between ANDM and OPDO leaders about ‘metekakt’, the susupicion of OPDO members as turn coat OLF symphatizers, the opposition about census results in Amhara region by ANDM officials, tell us a lot about the nature of these actors. This reminded me of how everybody used to think TPLF is an appendage of EPLF until the time comes for us to see that Eritrea has been a bone of contention for the TPLF top brass!! Who would have thought Seeye Abraha and et al would break off TPLF in support of Ethiopian nationalism. People are understating the capacities of organizations like OPDO and ANDM by the same exact fashion. Let us give them the benefit of the doubt.
Even more, arguing that TPLF has no doctrine, is a mafia like criminal organization or one that keeps changing its policies with time; these all miss one point. Such ‘craft’ in itself is an ideology.. in fact, politics is the art of the possible.No matter how much we disagree with TPLF/EPRDF we need to recognize that such prgamtism of the party is paying it off!!!
One of the staggering ommissions in this article is that it has not discussed the absolute monopoly of the TPLF over the military-security apparatus of the state..Let me be honest, these are not organizations that we can write about at leisure.. We hardly know what is going on in teh Ethiopian military let alone the intelligence!!But yes, the dynamics of these instituions is vital IF NOT DECISIVE in dictating the political future of the country!!
Finally I want to conclude with the remarkd of D, the very person who commented before me..
“I should add here, in case some haven’t noticed, that much of the ‘credit’, for the EPRDF’s pragmatic swing goes to Ethiopia. Despite a turbulent Zemene Mesafint, followed by brief monarchic stability, and then a devastating Dergue and a bitter, divisive EPRDF, the country ‘refused’ to capitulate. Instead, it has forced the EPRDF to change and adopt itself to the real Ethiopia, not the Ethiopia it thought it knew in the jungle”
@Abiye, you said and I am quoting you here’a power loci shift from the TPLF to other members would have to be accompanied by a similar shift in the army and security if your guess is to be plausible.There is no such shift in the two institutions(and for a reason)’. How true. But, this is how it should be. Positive changes intune with necessities are coming – slowly but surely. As they say, ‘Rome was not built over night’. Ages old historical dirt can not be washed away easily. Ethiopia is too sensitive to be left in the hands of daring individuals with skewed understading of history. If you really care about ALL Ethiopians, it is fair to expect you to understand that. And yeah, I am Amhara if it is relevant.
I think the writer forgot the core and central characteristics of TPLF and its leaders i.e. their obsession with their ethnicity. The TPLF leaders define themselves first and foremost as a Tigrean. They fought for their ethnicity and they are until today in the process of dominating every sector of the society by one ethnic group.
The writer completely lost sight to this core and fundamental nature of TPLF and its leaders. To think TPLF will reinvent itself and transform to a united national party shows only a lack of understand of the deep and core nature of the Tigrean society and the TPLF in particular. And as long as the real power is firmly in the hands of TPLF there will be no fundamental change even if millions join EPRDF. They are only foot soldiers and have nothing to say on critical matters.
It is totally illusive and unrealistic to wait for and expect some fundamental changes in TPLF. It is like TPLF and Shabia waiting for Dergue to transform itself to a democratic party. They could have waited forever. This will not happen in 100 years.
We should note that TPLF has morphed through time from a provincial militia army with the sole aim of liberating Tigray to a so called coalition of four parties that has dominated Ethiopian politics for two decades. During this period it has changed its ideology from Marxism to free market capitalism and back to revolutionary democracy. The TPLF continues to be a party immersed in ideological confusion whose paramount goal has been to grab political power and maintain it. Now I do not think it would be right to call this self-serving narrow minded strategy as that of pragmatism. I really doubt that. Since this march has turned out to be highly damaging to the democratic aspirations of the country as a whole. True the TPLF has grabbed and maintained political power but at what cost? Lefort has said the future would depend on what course the new leaders of TPLF would take. I think these new leaders are far too likely to be ones made in the mould of the old guards who would have no choice other than doing exactly what their mentors want them to do. Lastly, despite the writers urging to give chance to the OPDO and ANDM, there has not been any reason to warrant any one to hope that any meaningful change would come from these ‘parties’ as they were formed by TPLF to counter stronger groups like OLF and Prof. Asrat’s AAPO, they essentially remained as ‘teletafis’ or more fittingly “Oromiffa and Amaregna desks” of TPLF that say and do what TPLF tells them to. They remain weak as parties, unpopular in their respective regions with no real powers that in any way can be comparable to the powers held by TPLF leaders. Hence, the idea of passing the torch would go down as one of the usual charades of the TPLF if it is conducted the way Meles wants it to be- some thing close to the torch passing that was done in Syria and the one that is being prepared in Egypt.
Yes…EPRDF has shown itself adapting to any changes…
ITS CALLED EVOLUTION
I am yet to see the same from the oppositions…
(To the editor: I would be grateful if you could correct the possible grammatical and orthographical errors in the following text.)
Dear all,
Your numerous comments on my article prove that at least it dealt with a “hot” issue. I would like to add few comments to your comments, briefly and thus taking the risk of oversimplifying, with the aim of avoiding any misunderstanding, and again led by the necessity of rejecting any ideological presupposition or usual anathema, and of building on hard facts and hard facts only.
1. I have been surprised that what I sow as the main topic of my article hasn’t been commented by anybody. Shall I consider this as another proof of the gap I mentioned between the politicized urban elite and the mass of the Ethiopian population, the farmers? What I tried to demonstrate was that the outcome of the 2010 elections had been definitively set since the end of 2005, and that it is not mainly due, as commonly explained, to the “weakness” of the opposition, the intensification of the regime’s authoritarianism since 2008 (the laws about NGO’s, the press, “anti-terrorism”), or even the repression of the opposition’s militants during the electoral campaign. Of course, these factors must be taken into account, but essentially to explain why an inescapable defeat has transformed into the EPRDF’s “landslide victory” (here I leave aside the overreaction of the Front’s machinery, due to the zealous of its rank and file members, and the frauds during the vote and the counting).
- From the end of 2004 until a couple of weeks before the 2005 election’ day, the rural population experimented for the first time in its History a real electoral competition.
- Due to the incredible absence of the ruling power during most of the campaign and an ascending opposition mainly in the towns, the rural elite (which of course plays the role of “opinion leader” vis-à-vis the population) was able to convince around it that the inescapable winner would be the opposition. For this reason, and this reason above all, it made its first breakthrough in the countryside.
- But it appeared immediately that this vote had been not only useless (“whatever we vote, the EPRDF wins”), but above all detrimental (“we gained nothing”). The rural communities that had voted for the opposition couldn’t turn to their elected representatives to convey their demands to the authorities, as it’s the rule in any democratic representative system. These representatives most than often simply vanished, and in most if not all cases were rendered completely powerless to stand up for their constituency. On the opposite, these communities remained entirely under the same tight control of the same local authorities, of course fully determined to re-establish their absolute ascendency, while, as ever, their relationship with the latter dictates their access to all the means the State can offer –starting with access to the land-, in other words dictates no less than their survival.
- Thus, even at the end of 2005, these opinion leaders reacted in a fully rational way. They claimed they had made “a big mistake” by voting for the opposition, and that the 2005 election had “taught” them they should never do it again. The 2010 election was “cooked” since then.
This has tremendous long-term consequences, which I probably didn’t explain enough. It simply means than in a foreseeable future, these rural opinion leaders will not vote for the opposition and will not campaign for it (this is compulsory if the opposition wants to attract at least a significant part of the mass of the farmers) unless they will be 100% sure that it will win at the national level. I don’t understand how one can debate about any forthcoming evolution of the political landscape without taking this crucial fact into account.
2. After years of investigation in the country side, after having discussed with hundreds of farmers days and nights, I stick to my claim: the majority of the farmers have a world vision in which God is all-powerful, and thus in which the mengist stems from Him. They still feel they are subject, gebar (etymologically: ‘he who is subjected to the drudgery of labour/statute labour’, yesterday by his Lord, today by the mengist). “We are people to be ordered” is a spontaneous say I heard hundreds of times.
I would understand that this assertion would be contested if I would be the only one to forward it. But it is shared by a lot of scholars or experts with an in-depth knowledge of the rural culture. Thus, I strongly believe it must be taken for granted.
Anyway, for those who would still deny it, one can take another way to end up at the same conclusion. Nobody can contest that the local authorities have the power to arbitrarily decide which farmer accesses to fertilizers, credit, etc. and even continues to plough his plot, and which one can be deprived from all these inputs and assets without any appeal. Logically, “you must obey if you want to survive” is also a spontaneous say I heard hundreds of times. Thus the inescapable submissiveness of the overwhelmingly majority of the farmers, stemming either from this age-old mengist arbitrary or from this age-old cultural alienation (I believe from both, which reinforce each other).
Does it mean, as one commentator wrote, that in short I said the Ethiopians are and will remain ruled by God’s will? It’s ridiculous. I never wrote that “the farmers” are enclosed in this over-religious perception, because I know very well that particularly the small fringe of the farmers’ upper group, i.e. the rural elite, has distanced itself from it and desires more and more intensely to access to a full citizenship, even if the present situation prevents this group from becoming concretely active to this end.
But this submissiveness of by far the majority of the Ethiopian population, either forced or accepted, has another tremendous long-term consequence: this rural majority will still not be in a foreseeable future an actor as such of the political game, which therefore will remain confined to a small group of urban dwellers. Here again, I don’t understand how one can debate about any forthcoming evolution of the political landscape without taking this crucial fact into account.
3. Some commentators pointed that I didn’t mention the crucial role of the army and the security apparatus. They are right. I think that Teddy’s remark must be examined seriously: “Meles et. al are very much aware that the moment they loosen their smothering grip on their security machinery their house of cards would come down”. But this role can be considered as crucial only after having answered to the following question: have these forces acquired some degree of autonomy vis-à-vis the EPRDF (in fact the TPLF), or does the politic still remain in full command? Frankly said, I don’t know. The few I know is that:
- The TPLF’s commanders who have taken the control of the army after the dismantling of the army of the Derg will also now progressively retire;
- The junior officers recruited close to 20 years ago should now be automatically promoted to the highest positions, but will these promotions been made regardless of any ethnic criteria or not? Wait and see… The parallel with what will happen inside the EPRDF is obvious;
- These high commanders are entirely involved in the neo-patrimonial system that the EPRDF is building. If this system collapse, they will lose all the advantages they are gaining from it.
4. I would like to add one precision regarding the possible role of armed opposition groups. I entirely share the position of Birtukan Mideksa when she emphasizes that the means design the ends, in other words that a peaceful and democratic regime cannot emerge from a violent struggle.
5. Taking into account my present fields of research, I simply formulated the problem the EPRDF is now facing but without elaborating if and how it could solve it. Nevertheless, I would like to comment two assertions made by Derese Getachew and Lubak.
- Derese Getachew wrote: “Would such an arrangement ( between the old guard and the young Turks) hold or would the young Turks change the course of events and the direction of the Front once they take charge? Lefort is inclined to believe that such a patron-clientelist arrangement could hold given “the deepest sense of hierarchy that runs through the Ethiopian society as a whole”. I disagree”. Derese misunderstood me. I didn’t make any hypothesis regarding the sustainability of such an arrangement. What I said is that, given that these new incomers into the Party largely overlap with the traditional elites and/or the opinions leaders, the Party would be able through this in-building neo-patrimonial system to construct on them a constituency which, taking into account “the deepest sense of hierarchy that runs through the Ethiopian society as a whole”, could be strong enough to be followed by very large parts of the population and so to guarantee it a sustainable hegemony. But I added: at one condition, the “de-ethnicisation” of the EPRDF.
- Lubak wrote: “If TPLF enjoys the benefit of monopoly over everything in the country… I do not think the logic for TPLF to transform into a united national party”. In other words: what could push the TPLF for a more balanced power sharing between the four components of an enlarged EPRDF? I am sure that inside the TPLF, a firm belief exists that the present ethnic bias is not sustainable and can only end into a violent backlash, from which the Front’s members, at least the most notorious, and even simple Tigreans could be the first victims. Which proportion of its militants does share this belief? At which level of responsibility? Will they be as powerful as to re-orient the Front? I don’t know, but the replies to these questions will decisively shape the future of the TPLF, and thus of the regime.